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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
AD VALOREM TAXATION EXEMPTIONS AND
STATUTORY ENACTMENTS
Richard Buxman***
Petitioner, Canaveral Port Authority (CPA),' challenged the Department
of Revenue's assessment of an ad valorem tax, pursuant to sections
196.199(2) and (4) of the Florida Statutes,2 on property owned by CPA but
leased to a private entity engaged in nongovernmental activities
CPA
argued that because it was a political subdivision of the state, it was immune
from taxation, or alternatively, that it was exempt from taxation pursuant to
section 315.114 of the Florida Statutes.5 The trial court found that CPA was
6
immune from taxation because it was a political subdivision of the state.
The district court on appeal, however, found that CPA was not immune and
more importantly, not exempt from taxation because its property was not
* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Spring 1997.
** This comment is dedicated to Robert and Annarnaria Buxman.
1. Canaveral Port Auth. v. Department of Revenue, 690 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 1996).
2. FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (2), (4) (1995). Section 196.199(2) states, in relevant part:
Property owned by the following government units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions:
(a) Leasehold interests ... shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only
when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or
function, as defined in s. 196.012(6).
Id. § 196.199(2).
Section 196.012(6) states, in relevant part: "Governmental, municipal, or public
purpose or function shall be deemed to be served or performed when [any]... authority...
is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could properly
be performed or served by an appropriate governmental unit.. . ." Id. § 196.012(6).
Section 196.199(4) states, in relevant part: "Property owned by any municipality,
agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state ... shall be subject to ad
valorem taxation unless the lessee is an organization which uses the property exclusively for
literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes." Id. § 196.199(4).
3. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227.
4. FLA. STAT. § 315.11 (1995). Section 315.11 states, in relevant part: "[A]s such port
facilities constitute public property and are used for public purposes, the unit shall not be
required to pay any state, county, municipal, or other taxes or assessments thereon .... " Id.
5. Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1227.
6. Id.
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being directly used for port business.7 The Florida Supreme Court upheld
the lower court's decision and HELD, CPA's fee interest in property was not
immune from ad valorem taxation, nor was it exempt pursuant to section
315.11 because the property was not being used for purposes specifically
expressed in sections 196.199(2) and (4). 8
Traditionally, leasehold interests were treated as personal property instead
of real property and therefore, were not subject to ad valorem taxation.9 In
applying ad valorem tax exemptions, courts originally found such exemptions
grounded not in statutory or constitutional provisions, but instead, in broad
fundamentals of government. ° This focus, however, greatly changed as
case law developed." The change also caused the legislatures to modify
this common law rule by taxing leasehold interests.'
An early case that exemplifies the standard of assessing ad valorem
taxation on government-owned property is Daytona Beach Racing &
RecreationalFacilitiesDistrictv. Paul.'3 In Paul, Daytona Beach Raceway
and Recreational Facilities District leased -property from the city and
subleased the property to the Daytona International Speedway Corporation. 4
The property was used as part of the facilities of the Daytona Beach
International Speedway. The District Court of Appeal found that the
Speedway was, in essence, a private venture and not undertaken for a public
purpose, and that the leased land was being used for private profit. 5 This
decision was in conflict with prior cases that had construed "public purpose"

7. Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d 1097, 1103 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1994). The court explained that an entity's status as a political subdivision is
determined by its role as a branch in the general administration of the state's policy. Id. at
1101. Though the court reasoned that Florida did have political subdivisions that are immune
from taxation other than counties, it ultimately decided that CPA was not acting as an agent
of the state, but instead was created by a special act intended for a limited purpose. Id. The
court therefore held that CPA was not a political subdivision of the state and thus, was not
immune. Id. at 1103.
8. Canaveral,690 So. 2d at 1229-30.
9. Bonnie Roberts, Ad Valorem Taxation of Leasehold Interests in Governmentally
Owned Property, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1085, 1088 (1978) (covering the historical changes
regarding ad valorem taxation of government-owned leasehold interests).
10. State v. Alford, 107 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1958). The court explained that "'there is
no legal authority for imposing [county taxes] on lands held for the State in the name of the
Commission.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel. Charlotte County v. Webb, 49 So. 2d 93, 93 (1950))
(alteration in original). The court further noted that ad valorem taxation exemptions did not
arise from the statutory provisions granting them, but instead, were inherent in the
underpinnings of the governmental system. Id.
11. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 1088-98.
12. Id.
13. 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965).
14. Id. at 351.
15. Id.
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broadly and granted a tax exemption. 6 The Florida Supreme Court
explained that the land, though providing an incidental private gain, was
being used predominantly for the benefit of the public. 17 In its analysis, the
court examined the statutory language of the enabling act, which expressly
stated that the land was to be used for a public purpose.'" The court
deferred to the enabling act, decided that the district's land fell within the
meaning of the act, and upheld the tax exemption because the land was being
used for a public purpose.' 9

In 1971, the legislature repealed, via Chapter 71-133, all tax exemptions
granted by local or special acts and amended Chapter 196 of the Florida
Statutes.2° With these changes, courts were forced to alter their reasoning
and methods of analyses in determining tax exemptions.2 A leading case,
which focused on issues beyond the broad fundamentals of government and
helped develop a new standard, was Volusia County v. Daytona Beach
Racing & RecreationalFacilitiesDistrict.22 Revisiting the same facts as in
Paul, the Volusia court narrowly construed the phrase "public purpose" 23 in

interpreting the new statutory language of section 196.199.24 In contrast to
Paul, the court ignored the enabling act and placed the burden of proof on
the party claiming the tax exemption.2' The court reasoned that because the
corporation used the property primarily to make profits, no governmental
purpose was served.26 Finding that the claimant failed to meet the burden

of proving that the interest was used for a public purpose, the court denied
the tax exemption.
Seventeen years later, the court continued to grapple with the legislative
changes made in 197 1.27 In Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, a special
act created the Airport Authority, which eventually leased its property to
Sebring International Raceway, a for-profit organization.28 The Raceway

claimed that the property furthered a public purpose and therefore deserved

16. Id. at 352-53.
17. Id.

18.
19.
20.
21.
2d 498

Id. at 353.
Id. at 355.
1971 Fla. Laws ch. 133.
See Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist, 341 So.
(Fla. 1977).

22. Id.

23. See Volusia, 179 So. 2d at 502. The corporation involved in this case was a raceway,
the sole purpose of which was to provide entertainment for profit. Id.
24. FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (1995).
25. Volusia, 179 So. 2d at 502.
26. Id.
27. Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (1991).
28. Id. at 1072-73.
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a tax exemption. 29 The court avoided the enabling act and upheld the
narrow interpretation of the phrase "public purpose"3 in section 196.199."'
Ultimately, the court rejected the exemption and stated that even if the
Raceway were serving the public, the property was not being used for a
governmental or public purpose as defined under section 196. 199.32 Once
again, by strictly construing the presumption of a tax exemption against the
claimant, the court denied the request. Thus, the court held that the property
was not exempt from ad valorem taxes.3 3 From Volusia and McIntyre, it
was clear that the enabling 4 statutes needed to be harmonized with the
language in section 196.199.1
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of
whether Brevard County had the authority to impose an ad valorem tax,
pursuant to section 196.199 of the Florida Statutes,35 on the fee interest of
real property owned by CPA.36 CPA leased the property in question to
private individuals for nongovernmental activities.37 CPA argued that this
property was exempt from taxation38 under section 315.11 of the Florida
Statutes. 39 The Department of Revenue, however, argued that sections
41
196.00140 and 196.199 of the Florida Statutes superseded section 315.11.
This would subject CPA property to taxation unless the property were leased
to a nongovernmental entity for a nongovernmental purpose.42 Petitioner
argued that section 315.11 provides a blanket exemption for CPA, regardless

29. Id. at 1073.
30. Id. at 1073-74.
31.

FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (1995).

32. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d at 1074.
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 196.199; id.§ 315.11.
35. Id.
36. Canaveral Port Auth. v. Department of Revenue, 690 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 1996).
37. Id. The lessees used the property for warehouses, gas stations, deli restaurants, fish
markets, charter boat sites, and docks. Id. at 1227.
38. Id.
39. FLA. STAT. § 315.11.
40. Id. § 196.001. Section 196.001 states, in relevant part:
Unless expressly exempted from taxation, the following property shall be subject to
taxation in the manner provided by law:
(1)All real and personal property in this state and all personal property
belonging to persons residing in this state; and
(2) All leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state, or any
political subdivision, municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate
of the state.
Id.
41. Canaveral,690 So. 2d at 1229.
42. Id.
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of section 196. 199. 43 The court rejected petitioner's argument and held that
the property was subject to taxation.' In reaching this decision, the instant
court attempted to reconcile several competing authorities regarding the
legislative intent underlying the exemptions. 5
In 1971, the legislature repealed statutes similar to section 315.11 that
granted ad valorem tax exemptions. 6 From this repeal, the instant court
inferred that the legislature intended to limit the availability of exemptions
for fee interests in port authorities. However, the court erred in inferring this
because the legislature did not repeal section 315.11. 47 The instant court
concluded that, when read together, sections 196.001, 196.199(2), and
196.199(4) require that a property interest owned by an authority and leased
to a nongovernmental entity be taxed unless the property is used for a
governmental, municipal, or public purpose.48 In holding against CPA and
its exemption request, the instant court explained that section 315.11 must be
applied consistently with the requirements set forth in section 199.196(2) or
section 196.199(4).49 The instant court seemed uncertain as to the scope of
the exemption provided for in section 315.11 since it failed to address the
actual wording of the exemption. ° Instead, the instant court based its
holding only on an inference drawn from the legislature's Chapter 71-133
repeal of acts similar to section 315.11."'
Although this was the court's first attempt to reconcile these statutory
authorities, the court did so in a manner that contradicts express statutory
language, legislative intent, and the reasoning of earlier case law. Historically, courts have decided exemptions solely on the statutory language of the
enabling act." For instance, in State v. Pensacola, the court addressed
whether the city needed to pay taxes on the sale of natural gas by a city-

43. Id. Section 196.001 states that all property is subject to taxation unless expressly
exempt, FLA. STAT. § 196.001, and section 196.199 provides the exemption requirements for
property owned by CPA and leased to nongovernmental entities, FLA. STAT. § 196.199.
44. Canaveral,690 So. 2d at 1229.
45. Id.
46. See 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 133. Chapter 71-133 repealed "[a]ll exemptions granted by
special or local acts or general acts of local application." Id.
47. Canaveral,690 So. 2d at 1229 (stating, "[W]e conclude that the legislature intended
to provide only a limited exemption for fee interests in port authority property.").
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The lower court admitted that it was unable to find a case that had interpreted the
scope of the exemption provided by section 315.11 in light of the enactment of section
196.199. Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d 1097, 1102 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1994).
52. See Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349
(Fla. 1965); State ex rel. Green v. City of Pensacola, 126 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 1961).
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operated natural gas distribution system." In that case, Chapter 31166,
Special Acts of the Legilature, 1955, allowed Pensacola a tax exemption in
its operation of a natural gas distribution systemi 4 Because the Pensacola
court was dealing with an express statutory exemption," it held that there
would be a strong presumption in favor of the exemption's validity.56
Based on this presumption, the court validated the exemption.57 In addition,
in Paul,the court deferred to a legislative determination that Daytona Beach
Racing & Recreational Facilities District served a public purpose,5" and held
that the property leased by the District to a private entity was tax-exempt.5 9
The court stated that the exemption would stand unless legislatively
repealed.60
In the instant case, the court construed the following language in section
315.11: "As adequate port facilities are essential for the welfare of the
inhabitants and... as such port facilities constitute public property and are
used for public purposes, the unit shall not be required to pay any state,
county, municipal, or other taxes ... ."61 This language does not condition
the authority's tax exempt status on the use of the property. Rather, it
explains why the port authority is deserving of an exemption.62
This construction parallels previous judicial interpretations of similar
statutes that expressly provided exemptions.63 Under this interpretation,
which is supported by precedent, section 315.11 expressly designates CPA
as a public entity that uses its property for a public purpose. 6 Based on the
reasoning of Paul and Pensacola, the statutory language is decisive and
therefore, the instant court should have upheld the exemption by deferring to
the legislature.65

53. Pensacola, 126 So. 2d at 567-68.

54. Id. at 568 (citing 1955 Fla. Laws ch. 31166).
55. Id. The exemption states, in relevant part: "[T]he City of Pensacola, in its operation
of a natural gas distributing system to the inhabitants of the City of Pensacola... is hereby
exempted from taxation .... Id. at 568 n.2.
56. Id. at 569 (stating that "[i]nasmuch as Chapter 31166, in plain and unambiguous
language, grants the City of Pensacola an exemption from the tax in question, the rule of strict
construction is not needed and will not be applied.")
57. Id. The court further explained that the exemption statute stands on equal footing
with all other legislative enactments and that it possesses the same presumption of
constitutionality. Id.
58. 179 So. 2d at 351.
59. Id. at 355.
60. Id.
61. FLA. STAT. § 315.11 (1995).
62. See id.
63. See Pensacola, 126 So. 2d at 568.
64. See FLA. STAT. § 315.11.
65. See Paul, 179 So. 2d at 351; Pensacola, 126 So. 2d at 568 n.2.
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However, the 1971 repeal66 of similar express exemption statutes and

the enactment of sections 196.00 167 and 196.19968 created confusion on
this issue.6 9 While the legislature repealed all statutory provisions providing
leasehold exemptions, replacing them with statutory provisions providing
exemptions only when a property is being used for "governmental, municipal,
or public purposes, 7 0 section 315.11 was not among them. 7' One could
therefore argue that the legislature, by not repealing section 315.11, intended
the section to remain in effect and the port authority to continue to receive
an exemption despite section 196.199.72 Otherwise, the legislature would
have determined that section73 315.11 was subsumed within section 196.199
and would have repealed it.
In interpreting this statutory revision, subsequent courts never attempted
to reconcile the new statutes of Chapter 196 with existing enabling statutes
that expressly provided exemptions.74 Instead, they simply set aside the
enabling statutes and the concept of legislative deference, and interpreted
cases solely on an evolving common
law definition of "public purpose" as
7
contained in section 196. 199. 1
For instance, in Volusia,76 the court interpreted the phrase "public

66. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 133. The chapter was an act repealing all exemptions granted by
special or local acts or general acts of local application. Id.
67. FLA. STAT. § 196.001.
68. Id. § 196.199.
69. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 1092-95. In Dade County v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 275 So. 2d 505, 512 (Fla. 1973), the court granted an exemption to a leasehold
interest with a predominantly profit-oriented use. Roberts, supra note 9, at 1098. However,
in Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Raceway & RecreationalFacilitiesDistrict, 341 So. 2d
498, 502 (Fla. 1976), the court held that a profit-oriented use would render the leasehold
interest ineligible for an exemption. Roberts, supra note 9, at 1098.
70. Canaveral Port Auth. v. Department of Revenue, 690 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 1996).
71. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 133.
72. See Canaveral,690 So. 2d at 1229.
73. See id.
74. See Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d 1097, 1102 (Fla.
5th DCA 1994) (stating that "[n]o case was found that interprets the scope of the exemption
afforded by section 315.11 or the effect of enactment of section 196.199 on section 315.11").
75. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 1092-95. In the courts' eyes, "public purpose" meant
that the property was being used "primarily and predominantly for the public benefit even
though there may be some incidental private purpose, too." Id. at 1095 (quoting Dade County,
275 So. 2d at 512); see also Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 448, 45253 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the legislature could not exempt from real estate taxation
municipally owned property under a lease, which is not being used for municipal or public
purpose); Orlando Utils. Comm'n v. Milligan, 229 So. 2d 262, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
(holding that land used for the recreational benefit of the families of employees did not serve
a predominantly public purpose).
76. Volusia, 341 So. 2d at 498.
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purpose" based only on a narrow reading of section 196.199." 7 The court
reached this result without comparing the weight of the enabling statute,
which had expressly granted an exemption several years earlier,78 with the
language in section 196. 199. 7 1 In deciding the case solely on its own
interpretation of "public purpose," the court rejected case law that considered
the express language of enabling statutes. 0 In failing to explain the
relationship between the enabling statute and section 196.199, the Volusia
court effectively rendered statutes that expressly grant an exemption, such as
section 315.11, meaningless when a broader statute grants an exemption only
if a property is being used for a public purpose.8 This is problematic
because the legislature did not expressly repeal statutes such as section
315.11 when they enacted general exemption statutes.8 2 A valid interpretation of this failure is that the legislature intended statutes like section 315.11
to retain a meaning separate and distinct from that of section 196.199.
The instant case is the first case that both considers the legislature's
intent and attempts to reconcile or harmonize two conflicting, yet similar,
statutes.83 The lower court, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, attempted
to interpret the language of the enabling statute by examining the legislative

77. Id. at 502. The court, despite having granted an exemption in 1965 in Paul, 179 So.
2d 349, 355 (Fla. 1965), refused to grant the same authority an exemption because it held that
the Speedway existed only to make profits for its shareholders and therefore, did not serve a
governmental purpose. Id. The Volusia court held that it was the use of the property which
was leased from a governmental source that determined its constitutional taxability. 341 So.
2d at 502.
78. See Paul, 179 So. 2d at 355.
79. See Volusia, 341 So. 2d at 502.
80. Id. The result of this narrow interpretation of prior case law was that any leasehold
interest used for private profit would be deemed proprietary and thus ineligible for an
exemption. See id. This case seemed to hold that any property expressly exempted by statute
would not be exempt unless it was being used for an exclusively governmental purpose. Id.
81. See id. The court held that the corporation existed only to make profits for its
shareholders; therefore, it did not perform a governmental function and was ineligible for a
tax exemption. Id.
82. See FLA. STAT. § 315.11 (1995); see also Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 642 So.
2d 1072 (Fla. 1994). McIntyre further exemplifies the Supreme Court of Florida's failure to
reconcile the enabling act with section 196.199. Id. at 1073-74. In McIntyre, the court, by
invalidating an exemption to the Raceway, held that although the agency may serve the public,
it does not operate under a public purpose as required by the court's narrow interpretation.
Id. The court neither mentioned the enabling statute nor explained the statute's relation to that
court's narrow interpretation of the general exemption statutes. Id. Instead, the court ignored
the express language of the enabling statute and subsumed it within the court's discussion of
"public purpose." Id. The court, by invalidating an exemption to the Raceway, held that
although the agency may serve the public, it does not operate under a public purpose as
required by the court's narrow interpretation. Id. The court stated, "We have no doubt that
Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such service does not fit within
the definition of public purpose defined by section 196.012(6)." Id. at 1074.
83. See Canaveral Port Auth. v. Department of Revenue, 690 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 1996).
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definition of "port facility."' It stated: "The legislature has defined the
term 'port facilities'"5 broadly, but not, we think, so broadly as to embrace
property on which commercial activity is being carried on by private lessees
at their port facility."86 The instant court seemed to take a different
approach by not distinguishing the language of the two statutes or addressing
any differences in their requirements, but by simply inferring that section
315.11 is subsumed within section 196.199.87 Indeed, the court fails to
explain how section 315.11, which was not repealed by the legislature, is
limited by the enactment of section 196.199, or why it is not distinct from
section 196.199. This view would support the CPA's argument that section
315.11 provides a blanket exemption for port authority districts.8 8
By ignoring case law that deferred to express statutory language, the
instant court, provides little guidance to future courts and confuses the issue
of ad valorem taxation.89 Prior to 1971, the courts looked to express
statutory language and afforded great legislative discretion. 90 The instant
court should have applied this interpretation to statutes that survived the 1971
repeal, such as section 315.11. However, the court based its decision on
inferred legislative intent and failed to dispel an equally plausible counterinterpretation of the legislature's actions. 9' By not repealing section 315.11,
the legislature could have intended that the statute retain its distinct and
separate express language. 92 Until a court directly addresses this issue,
confusion will continue to arise. This case may prompt the legislature to
further clarify its laws by distinguishing section 315.11, or by repealing all
statutes expressly providing exemptions. The latter option would then force
a future court to address only section 196.199.

84. Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d 1097, 1103 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1994).
85. See FLA. STAT. § 315.02(6). Port facilities, as described in section 315.11, are defined
to include: "harbor, shipping, and port facilities, and improvements of every kind, nature, and
description, including, but without limitation, channels ... docks, markets, parks, recreational
facilities, structures, [and] buildings." Id.
86. Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Canaveral Port Auth., 642 So. 2d 1097, 1103 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1994).
87. See Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229.
88. See id.
at 1228.
89. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
90. See Canaveral, 690 So. 2d at 1229.

91. See id.
92. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
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